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A ‘basket of goods approach’ as an alternative to strict legal distinctions between 
migrants and refugees 
 
Stefan Schlegel1 
 
1. Introduction 
A lot of the normative literature on the duty to protect refugees sets out from the assumption 
that refugees’ reasons to migrate are qualitatively distinct from other migrants’ reasons and that 
it is possible, with reasonable certainty, to assess which individual falls within which group. In 
this article, I attempt to show that not only is it impossible to pin down a qualitative difference 
between refugees (under the current legal definition or under any other proposed definition) 
and other involuntary migrants, it is also impossible to distinguish between political, economic 
and environmental causes for migration. In addition to that, it is impossible to draw a clear line 
between involuntary and voluntary migration. While migration law might be condemned to rely 
on trigger points beyond which people are included in a category of special protection, the 
normative debate about where to locate this point would improve if it set out from the consensus 
that it necessarily remains a fictitious point. Once this is acknowledged, the normative debate 
on involuntary migration can be redirected towards procedures that assess the voluntariness of 
individual migration decisions and the need for protection in individual cases on a gradual 
spectrum. I argue that a central criterion in this procedure should be the relative value that the 
good “control over one’s own migration” has in the basket of goods of potential refugees. The 
higher they value this good, the stronger their claim to be included in a special status of 
protection.  
To develop this argument, it is helpful to think of the right to decide over a given person’s 
migration to a given place as a property right. Property rights are defined as the exclusive 
control over a valuable resource or aspects of it (see Posner 2011, 39). Migration, in this view, 
is a resource. The right to decide over a given person’s migration, therefore, is a valuable asset, 
which can be in the hands of a state or the individual concerned or could theoretically be in the 
hands of some third agent (see Schlegel 2017, 111-12). If you happen to hold the right to decide 
                                                          
1 Stefan Schlegel is senior researcher at the department for public law at the University of Berne. His research 
interests include Human Rights Law, Constitutional Law and International Law. Research for this article has been 
enabled by a Fellowship at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen, 
Germany.  
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on your own migration, you are better off than if you do not. To have control over that resource 
is a precondition for a whole spectrum of economically interesting activities and – more 
important in many contexts – a precondition to save your life and liberty. It is therefore of 
significant value and if it were available in a market, people would pay substantial sums of 
money for it. A central task of immigration law is to allocate this asset to one of the agents who 
are competing for it. It is normally allocated to the receiving country so that it legally wields 
the control over immigration. This general rule is punctuated by quantitatively important 
exceptions. The clearest and most paradigmatic exceptions are systems of free movement of 
persons as they were established most importantly within the EU and with some of its 
neighbours and as they are becoming more prevalent throughout the world. In these cases, the 
control over the good “migration of person X to state A” has been transferred from state A to 
person X. Another important exception to the rule, where the good of access to another country 
(or at least important aspects of this bundle of rights)2 is allocated to migrants rather than to 
states, is the realm of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its additional protocol of 1967 (see 
Schlegel 2018, 120-21). Refugees hold a “trump card on migration control” in the sense that 
they control important aspects of their migration (Gammeltoft-Hansen/Hathaway 2015, 237). 
The case of refugees, therefore, constitutes an instructive exception to the common allocation 
of the property right over migration. In what follows, I try to show the value of a property rights 
approach for answering the question which individuals within the larger group of migrants 
should be included in a status of special protection.  
The problem at the outset is the conception of refugees and migrants as two clearly 
distinguishable groups of people and the goal, explicitly stated by policymakers at the UN-
Level that “managed migration systems should […] be based on a clear distinction between the 
different categories of persons” – their notion of “mixed migration flows” and the request to 
“protect refugees within the broader migration movements” (Schuster 2016, 300). The Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration of 2018 echoes this view when it states: 
                                                          
2 To conceive of the control over someone’s migration as a bundle of rights might seem far-fetched. However, if 
we conceive of the control over someone’s migration as an asset, it is hard to argue that it cannot be subdivided 
into different aspects, some of which may then be allocated to the bundle of rights of one agent and some to the 
bundle of another agent. For instance, the control over entering a country and the control over remaining in this 
country are two aspects of the larger asset of control over migration. As is the case in refugee law, one of these 
rights is allocated to a refugee (the control over remaining in the territory), the other to the receiving state (the 
control over entering the country). This argument draws on the observation that citizenship is “a particularly 
complex type of property-like entitlement” (Shachar 2009, 30). If citizenship can usefully be analyzed as a 
property-like entitlement then the same should be true for less well-entrenched statuses towards a state, like the 
statuses – or bundles of rights – of migrants and of the refugees among them. 
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“migrants and refugees are distinct groups governed by separate legal frameworks.”3 These 
formulations sustain the position, dominant in political theory, that refugees are a normatively 
distinct group (see Lister 2013, 654; Miller 2016, 78; Ott 2016, 15) and hence that there must 
be a bright line or a “morally relevant line” (Miller 2016, 82) that runs between those who fall 
into the group of migrants and those who fall into the group of refugees, wherever this line may 
be drawn exactly (see Ramji-Nogales 2017, 8-10; Crawley/Skleparis 2017, 50). This might 
serve to legitimize some migrants that need protection particularly desperately but also to 
delegitimize others (see Scheel/Ratfisch 2013, 390).  
In the remainder of this article, the next section locates the problem of bright lines in the nature 
of the refugee status as a right (rather than a privilege). The following section unpacks the 
problem and demonstrates that it is not just one, but several spectrums through which an 
arbitrary line has to be drawn when delimiting the extent of the status of special protection. The 
final section addresses possible remedies among which I identify the basket of goods as the 
most promising one.  
 
2. The impossibility of avoiding clear lines  
The problem of fictitious bright lines concerns the very structure of rights. Individual rights are 
consequences granted under certain conditions and these conditions are either fulfilled or not. 
Or rather, there has to be some sort of procedure, some authoritative instance that ultimately 
decides whether these conditions are fulfilled and therefore whether the consequences apply or 
do not (see Honsell/Mayer-Maly 2017, 57-58). The alternative is to grant no rights and only 
provide for the possibility to extend some sort of protection. This would be a humanitarian or 
merit-based conception of asylum – protection granted discretionarily on the basis of 
generosity, a sense of sympathy or special merit of some of those seeking protection (see e.g. 
for the reception of Hungarian refugees in Western Europe after 1956 Piguet 2013, 74).  
As soon as there is a right to protection, the conditions under which this right applies can be 
improved, enlarged, made more generous, but there is no escape from the need for conditions 
and therefore no escape from the fiction of clear lines. Both these conditions and the procedure 
to verify whether they are fulfilled are necessarily arbitrary in the sense that at the fringes the 
line could always be drawn somewhat differently (see Gibney 2018, 2). It is never possible to 
                                                          
3 United Nations General Assembly resolution 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 
19 December 2018, Preamble, n. 4.  
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convincingly argue that the line between those who are protected and those who are not has to 
be drawn at this exact point on the spectrum.  
So in what follows, I am not so much concerned with the question of whether the definition of 
who qualifies as a refugee is clear or generous enough. I am concerned with the problem of 
subsumption that occurs whenever a legal rule attaches certain consequences to certain 
conditions, no matter how accurately or widely or flexibly these conditions are formulated.  
In the case of the UN Refugee Convention, the conditions and the consequence are somewhat 
dispersed (see Aleinikoff/Zamore 2018, 31). They are not part of one and the same article. The 
convention starts out with a definition of who qualifies as a refugee, thereby stating the 
conditions. The most central part of these conditions reads:  
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person 
who: 
(2) (…) owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; (…).4 
The most important consequence of these conditions being fulfilled is then stated in art. 33 of 
the Convention:  
Prohibition of expulsion or return (refoulement) 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.5 
People who fulfill the conditions have, as a consequence, a de facto right to remain6 as long as 
the above conditions remain fulfilled – a right of non-refoulement, not a right of entry. The 
                                                          
4 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 
UNTS 137, art. 1 A. 
5
 Ibid. As the term “refugee” in art. 33 of the Convention clarifies, this specific non-refoulement exclusively 
applies to refugees in the sense of art. 1 of the Convention (with the exception of persons not deserving protection 
under its art. 1 F) (see Kälin et al. 2011, n. 112). Other sources of international law, notably the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered 
into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85, in its art. 3, provide more extensive protection against refoulement to 
individuals who face a real risk of being exposed to torture (see Nowak/McArthur 2008, 200). The European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 1950, entered 
into force 3 September 1953) protects against refoulement to states where there is a “real risk” of being subjected 
to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Harris et al. 2018, 247).  
6 Technically, non-refoulement does not amount to a right to remain since the deportation to “frontiers” other than 
those of the territories where there is a risk of persecution in the sense of the convention remains permissible. That, 
however, is a highly theoretical possibility outside of the context of areas of a common asylum policy as it has 
been established within the Schengen Area. The deportation of (rejected) asylum seekers or refugees to third 
countries remains very difficult – the special case of Australia and neighbouring micro-island states set aside. 
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bundle of rights that is transferred by the Refugee Convention does not contain a right legally 
to migrate. Under the Convention, “(…) migrants must already have moved in order to become 
eligible for the right to move” (Ramji-Nogales 2017, 9; see also Aleinikoff/Zamore 2018, 31). 
The fact that individuals obtain a right to remain, a right of non-refoulement, not a right of entry 
causes a lot of the distress in the context of involuntary migration. This is not the main concern 
of this paper but I will come back to it at the end when I discuss how a property rights-approach 
may help to restructure the bundle of rights of refugees. 
 
3. Dimensions of uncertainty 
The problem with the binary world of legal rules on migration rights is that though the lines are 
extremely clear in the realm of the consequences – e.g. to be or not to be protected from 
refoulement – the conditions are unclear. They provide no bright lines and this is so in at least 
six different dimensions:7  
 The first dimension of uncertainty concerns the motives to migrate and the distinction 
between (at least) political, economic and environmental events that may have caused 
migration. Political events, as understood here, are much broader than persecutions for 
political opinions, as in art. 1 A of the Refugee Convention. All other motives of 
persecution under the Convention and all other events emanating from the political 
situation in the country of origin are part of political motives. The point here is the 
distinction of political motives from economic and environmental motives. Every 
refugee in the sense of the Convention has motives stemming from the political situation 
in her country of origin but not all the political motives for migration qualify a migrant 
as a refugee.  
 Second dimension: within the scope of political reasons, it is unclear, which of the 
political events amount to persecution and which not – which emigrations are just 
                                                          
Israel’s negotiations with several African states to take in rejected asylum seekers faltered (seeYaron 2018). The 
same is true for earlier attempts by Switzerland (see Ellermann 2008, 168). Where alleged refugees are transferred 
to contracting states within a common system for the allocation of the responsibility for refugee procedures (like 
the Dublin-System), the transferring state is not freed from the obligation to verify that the receiving state 
guarantees for non-refoulement as well (see for the more expansive guarantee of non-refoulement under the 
European Convention of Human Rights: European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) 21 January 2011, 
Appl. no. 30696/09 (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece), no. 359-60). Under these qualifications, it may be said that 
refugees, once within the jurisdiction of a signatory state, factually hold a right to remain – at least within the area 
of a common asylum policy and at least as long as the risk of persecution persists and refugees do not commit 
crimes that amount to the possibility to exclude them from the status of refugees (art. 1 F, Refugee Convention).  
7 Other dimensions could be added. For instance, there is a continuum between the five officially recognized 
reasons for prosecution in the convention and other reasons.  
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caused by a chilling, intimidating or hopeless political situation (see Nathwani 2000, 
377)? 
 Third dimension: if we accept that people will have a multitude of reasons to migrate 
(see Crawley/Skleparis 2017, 55), it is unclear, which of these reasons is the one that 
ultimately triggers the emigration.  
 Fourth dimension: it is unclear where the line between forced and voluntary migration 
runs (see Nathwani 2000, 367; Crawley/Skleparis 2017, 50).  
 Fifth dimension: It is also unclear when within his or her biography an individual 
migrant, faced with deteriorating conditions, crosses the line between voluntary and 
involuntary migration. Therefore, there is no bright line on the temporal axis either.  
 Sixth dimension: it is unclear in which cases an individual migratory event needs to have 
a long and in which cases only a short migration vector. Did people who had no choice 
but to leave their country also have no choice but to come all the way here or would 
they have had the possibility to seek refuge closer to home? What within their bundles 
of reasons to migrate triggered their decision – if it was their decision – to come here?  
In all these dimensions, we face a gradual reality through which legal practice has to cut a clear 
line.  
 
3.1. Misleading maps  
Let us zoom into the first dimension, the problem of determining whether reasons for a 
migratory event stem from political events. Under the Convention definition of a refugee, this 
specific bright line is less crucial than the line between persecution and other forms of pressure 
to emigrate (the second dimension of uncertainty in the above list). However, let us assume, for 
the sake of the argument, that the definition of who is a refugee would have been simplified 
along the lines of the 1936 definition of the Institut du Droit International8 and that political 
motives for emigration were therefore the crucial element that leads to an entitlement to special 
                                                          
8 In 1936, the Institut de Droit International drafted a definition of a refugee that renounced both on the otherwise 
crucial elements of persecution and of involuntariness and simply stated that a refugee is whoever left the territory 
of a state as a cause of political events in that territory (see Kimminich 1962, 22). The definition reads: “In the 
present resolutions the term ‘refugee’ refers to any individual which, due political events that occurred in the 
territory of the state of his former habitual residence has left said territory voluntarily or other and remains outside 
of said territory and has not obtained a new nationality and does not enjoy diplomatic protection of any other 
state”, (my translation). The original text in French reads: “Dans les présentes Résolutions, le terme ‘réfugié’ 
désigne tout individu qui, en raison d’événements politiques survenus sur le territoire de l’Etat dont il était 
ressortissant, a quitté volontairement ou non ce territoire ou en demeure éloigné, qui n’a acquis aucune nationalité 
nouvelle et ne jouit de la protection diplomatique d’aucun autre Etat.” (Institut du Droit International 1936).  
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protection. Even if we are unconvinced by this definition, the argument is helpful since other, 
more restrictive definitions, like the one of the 1951 Convention still imply that the reasons for 
emigration are political in the sense of this definition. So that hurdle has to be taken anyway.  
It is common to distinguish reasons for migration into economic, environmental and political 
reasons. If we were to map these reasons for each individual migratory event, we would do so 
in a triangle with those three reasons at its poles. There might be events that are almost 
exclusively triggered by either economic or environmental or political reasons. They would be 
mapped in the respective corner. Other events, where reasons are more mixed, would be 
mapped somewhere in the middle of the triangle. Even if we knew which of the reasons that 
triggered a migratory event were to be counted as political reasons, it remains entirely arbitrary 
where within the triangle the line is to be drawn between those individuals whose reasons to 
migrate are mainly political and those whose reasons are not. For those on the fringes even a 
small shift of the line between those who are and those who aren’t protected makes a big 
difference. There are no compelling reasons why the line should be drawn exactly where it is 
(see Crawley/Skleparis 2017, 82).9 The same is true if we were to establish other special 
protection statuses, for, say, “climate refugees” (see e.g. Deen 2017). There would just be 
another line to be drawn and it would be even more difficult to find a convincing point on the 
spectrum to draw it.  
In any case, such a map would suggest objectivity that does not exist. It is impossible to explain 
why a political reason is not an environmental or economic reason or vice versa. The question 
of where to map migratory events within the triangle is highly dependent on the theory used to 
explain global inequalities in wealth, development, good governance, etc. If those who have to 
do the mapping (those in charge of taking a decision) tend to explain global inequalities and 
vulnerabilities by a geographical hypothesis (in the sense of Acemoglu/Robinson 2013, 48-56), 
they will tend to find environmental reasons dominant and at the source of poverty and conflict. 
If the decision makers tend to rely on cultural theories, they will find little politics behind 
economic inequalities and explain them with cultural differences. If, on the other hand, they 
                                                          
9 This could be said of other lines that are drawn by legal norms, e.g. that the voting age is reached exactly at age18 
(and not a few months earlier or later) and that driving under the influence of alcohol is a felony from 0.5 per mill 
upwards. There are two important differences however. First, age limits are reached by anyone at a given time and 
alcohol-limits can be influenced by the drinker. The arbitrariness of the line drawn is therefore of a passing nature 
or behaviour can be influenced in order to respect the line. The line is much less just a fate than in the case of the 
determination of refugee status. Second, measuring whether these lines are crossed in individual cases (the 
subsumption) is trivial compared to the question whether a given person falls within a specific definition of refugee 
status.  
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lean towards institutional explanations, which doubt the importance of geographical or climatic 
effects on political and economic outcomes and dismiss the critical influence of cultural 
differences, then every driver of emigration has a causal link to political institutions. Political 
reasons, in this view, would always be identified as the ultimate trigger.  
Is there a possibility to give an environmental explanation of the civil war in Syria? There has 
been a debate about the contribution of a drought – driven by climate change – in the accelerated 
movements to cities that might have helped to trigger the upheaval that led to armed conflict. I 
am not concerned with the question of whether this explanation is empirically convincing (it 
seems not to be in this specific case, see Selby et al. 2017), but with the fact that it is conceivable 
in principle that environmental reasons contribute decisively to the outbreak of armed conflict. 
Depending on how much weight the decision makers attribute to these aspects of the conflict, 
involuntary migrants would have to be mapped closer to the environmental corner of the 
triangle. But then the question would occur, why was a drought enough to displace a big number 
of people from the countryside to cities? Aren’t the reasons behind such a lack of resilience 
economic? And aren’t the explanations for this economic situation ultimately political?  
It is futile to pin down the actual reason or a first link in the causal chain. The idea of a linear 
explanation is already too simplistic (see Boom 2018, 526). So such a triangular map is 
misleading in suggesting objectivity regarding the reasons to migrate that is not there. Still, the 
map is helpful to stress the problem that only gradual distinctions are possible.  
 
3.2. Degrees of involuntariness  
We can develop this map further into a three-dimensional space in which conditions of 
migration could be tentatively mapped: the motives for migration within the horizontal space 
of the two-dimensional triangle, the degree of (in)voluntariness on the vertical axis. The more 
involuntary a migratory event, the higher up it is placed on the vertical axis. We realize that 
migration law only allows for protection within a small part of the space thus mapped. It implies 
that necessity to migrate can only build up around the political pole of the triangle. It is only 
around this corner that migration law provides room for special protection. People who are 
forced to leave a country for reasons that are perceived as either environmental or economic 
fall outside the space in which legal protection can be granted.  
In sum, we face two major problems when seeking to provide legal protection for those most 
in need: An over-reliance on political reasons rather than on a multitude of reasons, and a lack 
of objective criteria for determining which reasons can ultimately be traced back to political 
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conditions or more narrowly to persecution. How could the idea to treat access to migration as 
a good (and the control over this good as a property right), help to find remedies? 
 
4. Remedies 
The pre-Convention situation of discretionary political protection instead of legal protection is 
certainly not a solution for this state of affairs. Such political protection cannot possibly replace 
the individual right of non-refoulement and the procedural rights linked to this guarantee (see 
Feller 2005, 28). This would expose refugees to the goodwill and the sympathy of governments, 
instead of being protected by rights.  
 
4.1. Partial remedies  
One partial remedy is to stretch the notion of persecution (see Miller 2016, 79) (and thereby 
also the notion of political motives) to include the divorced women in Pakistan, the 
homosexuals from Jamaica or Uganda, Christian converts from Iran, Afghans fleeing blood 
feuds, Eritrean conscience objectors etc. This has been done to some degree in European 
countries (see Kälin 2011, 28). But there is a limit to this path. Think of the people displaced 
by an earthquake or by an expanding desert or by a complete lack of means of sustenance. It is 
not that these reasons are not political – they are in the sense that the shortfalls of political 
institutions are partly responsible for the vulnerability of these people – but it is beyond the 
possibilities of extensive interpretation to count this as persecution (see Carens 2013, 200; 
Boom 2018, 518). 
Another partial remedy is to lower the cliff at the point in the spectrum, where the line is drawn. 
This ensures that an ultimately arbitrary decision has only a limited effect. This has happened 
in recent years as the status of subsidiary protected people has been improved in many European 
countries, Canada, Australia and New Zealand (see McAdam 2014, 209). Within the EU this 
has been achieved mainly through the new qualification directive of 2011, which in its chapter 
VII approximates the rights for beneficiaries of refugee status and subsidiary protection with 
the exception of the duration of residence permits and access to social welfare (see ECRE 2013). 
But preponderance of political reasons remains still in place and access to the good of 
“international mobility” or more precisely access to the good “right to remain” is still allocated 
in a problematic manner.  
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Understanding this access as a good that needs to be allocated to either the receiving state (who 
can then discretionarily decide whether to admit somebody or not) or to the individual in 
question might offer a better remedy to the problem. 
 
4.2. The basket of goods as an assessment tool 
The key idea that flows from the understanding of international mobility as a good is the concept 
of a basket of goods. It conceives of would-be-migrants as agents who try to compose a basket 
of goods that maximizes the satisfaction of their preferences within the restrictions of their 
budget. If their budget is enlarged, they may put goods in their basket that are useful to them 
but not quite as useful as goods that they have put in their basket previously. If their budget is 
restricted, they will have to cut out goods from their basket, starting with the goods with the 
lowest relative value to them and moving on to more and more important goods as their budget 
is further restricted, just keeping in their basket what is most important to them. The question 
is then up to what point individual migrants would keep the good ‘control over their own 
international mobility’ in their basket if their budget is further and further restricted. On what 
level of the pyramid of needs would they place it? Is it a nice-to-have-good, or a necessary-to-
have-good? The higher the relative value they ascribe to the good ‘control over their own 
migration’, the better their claim to be included into a status of special protection. A series of 
conceptual difficulties around the normative question of whom to include in a status of special 
protection can be clarified with this metaphor.  
 
4.3. Surrogates 
In the legal and the normative debate on the protection of refugees, a lot of arguments revolve 
– explicitly or implicitly – around the problem of surrogate goods to international mobility. 
International mobility is understood as a surrogate to other goods that are depicted as preferable 
to mobility, much like butter is to margarine: protection by the country of origin, development 
aid, disaster relief, international intervention into warring or failed states and protection in the 
region (see Lister 2016, 48). Once outside the country of origin, the right to return becomes a 
possible surrogate to a right to stay. If understood as entitlements that can be demanded from a 
state or the international community, all of the above are conceivable surrogate goods to the 
control over ones’ own migration. A first issue that the basket of goods helps to sort out, 
therefore, is the question of the availability of surrogate goods – and whether they are “on 
offer” in a particular situation (Carens 2013, 202).  
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By emphasizing the growing relative value of control over ones’ own international mobility as 
surrogate options become less available, the concept of the basket of goods lends support to 
theories that argue to extend special international protection to “fleers of necessity” 
(Aleinikoff/Zamore 2018; similar Nathwani 2000, 368), to people who have no choice but to 
migrate in order to have their human rights protected (see Miller 2016, 83), to theories that 
underline the lack of protection by a country of origin (see Shacknove 1985, 277), be this in the 
guise of lacking diplomatic protection, statelessness or de-facto-statelessness (see Owen 2016, 
747). Unlike theories that emphasize the motive for emigration (like persecution) or the motives 
of state and non-state agents who deprive people of surrogates to emigration (see Lister 2016; 
Feller 2005, 28), the basket of goods focuses on the question of the relative value of the 
possibility to migrate, regardless of the reasons for the lack of alternatives.  
Compared for instance to Miller’s view, human rights, much like the element of persecution, 
do not play a special role other than that their violation typically impairs the availability of 
surrogate options to emigration. The key is a lack of alternatives to migration – independently 
of the responsibility of the country of origin. That lack of alternatives leads to a situation in 
which access to migration becomes not just a valuable, but an indispensable good for the 
individuals concerned. 
 
4.4. Enhancing the agency of involuntary migrants  
The question of whether surrogate goods are on offer in a specific situation and whether they 
are conceived as acceptable surrogates are separate questions. Answering the second of these 
questions by some representative of a receiving state inevitably contains an element of 
paternalism. It implies that state agents without detailed knowledge of a given biography and 
of local circumstances have a better grasp of alternative solutions than the migrant in question. 
The concept of a basket of goods moderates this paternalism by emphasizing consumer 
sovereignty. It assumes that the individual, whose basket of goods is at stake, is best placed to 
judge the relative value and quality of international mobility compared to other goods. Absent 
specific indicators of an impaired judgment by a given migrant, the receiving state would have 
to be very reluctant in imposing its own judgment over that of a migrant.  
Like margarine can be a suboptimal surrogate to butter, butter can be a suboptimal surrogate to 
margarine, depending on the preferences of the individual in question. The same is true for 
international mobility and possible surrogates. Their relative value depends on two things: the 
alternative goods on offer and individual preferences. The basket of goods stresses the 
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importance of taking information and preferences of alleged refugees into account when 
assessing their claims. To take individual preferences into account is not to say that these 
preferences automatically lead to a positive decision. The decision maker within a receiving 
state has to ponder the question whether an objectified third person would probably have taken 
a similar decision. The technique of an objectified, reasonable third person is often used by 
judges in very different contexts. In the context of migration law, it would serve as a thinking 
tool that forces decision makers to imagine themselves in the shoes of the asylum seeker. It 
thereby emphasizes the freedom- and agency-enhancing effect of the control over ones’ own 
international mobility and thereby the agency of the most marginalized and dependent group of 
people within the larger group of migrants (see Aleinikoff/Zamore 2018, 42).  
 
4.5. Temporal Issues  
Composing a basket of goods is done with a degree of foresight. It can be composed not only 
with the question in mind “what do I need today?”, but also with the question “what do I need 
tomorrow?” This entails the question “what surrogates will be available tomorrow?” If potential 
refugees believe it to be foreseeable that no surrogates to the control over international mobility 
will be available tomorrow – because they foresee their situation in a country of origin 
deteriorating with no practical remedy available, they would insist on the necessity to keep the 
control over their migration in their basket of goods today. Unlike theories that emphasize 
persecution or immediate threats to human rights or immediate necessity, the basket of goods 
does not require potential refugees to wait until their situation has deteriorated to a state of 
utmost vulnerability or victimhood or a complete lack of choice. It would be sufficient for them 
to demonstrate that such deterioration is the plausible scenario if emigration is not on offer as 
a surrogate good. The basket of commodity allows therefore extending special protection to 
migration as a legitimate form of adaptation, ahead of extreme deprivation, before emigration 
becomes the only conceivable remedy to their plight (see Twele 2016, 34). In a system in which 
access to a status of special protection remains a scarce good and people have to queue for it, 
the basket of goods approach would help to order the queue. Those who are deprived of 
surrogates to migration in the immediate future would be in the front of the queue; those who 
will likely face this deprivation in the slightly more distant future would be further in the back.  
 
4.6. The choice of the destination  
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If the control over someone’s migration (to any given place) is an asset, it follows that the 
control over migration to any specific place is a partial aspect of that larger good. If the good 
can be split and only one aspect of it can be put into or kept in a basket of goods, then control 
over the migration to different destinations are also surrogate goods to each other. The question 
which country should be responsible for the protection of a given migrant can then be 
approached from the question of which destination is of particular value to this given migrant. 
If this particular migrant had to renounce on the entry tickets to any country but one, which one 
would she have kept and how big is the difference in relative values between the most valuable 
and the second most valuable destinations for a particular migrant? In cases of a large difference 
in relative value, asylum seekers can then be identified as “particularity claimants” (in the sense 
of Miller 2016, 77). This is not to imply that migrants, as soon as they fall within the scope of 
entitlement to special protection, should be free to choose where to go. It is just to suggest that 
their valuation of alternative destinations should have some weight in the allocation of 
responsibility for their protection (see Owen 2016, 746).  
 
4.7. Re-bundle the bundles of rights  
The concept of the basket of goods may help to rethink the structure of the bundle of rights that 
is allocated to whoever qualifies as a refugee. The bundle of rights of refugees, as it is currently 
structured, contains no right to enter a country although it contains a (de facto) right to remain 
in the country or the area of a common asylum system. This absence of admission rights is 
responsible for many tragic clandestine journeys that end much too often fatally and for the fact 
that so many people in dire need of protection have no practical means to seek protection. 
Analyzing the possibility to decide over someone’s migration as a good allows developing 
arguments on how the bundle of rights should be structured. In the case of refugees, there is 
consensus that the right to decide whether they may remain in a given country (non-
refoulement) belongs into their bundle of rights (and not in the bundle of the state or any third 
agent). If that holds true, it is then difficult to refute that the right to enter a country is a 
precondition for the practical use of the right to remain. In cases where the right to remain has 
a high value even before spending time in a country and making country-specific investments 
it is therefore unconvincing that the right to enter is not in the same bundle of rights as the right 
to remain. This is as if the right to cultivate the land and the right to walk on the same land 
would be dispersed into two different bundles of rights. It significantly lowers the value of both 
sticks within their respective bundle (see Friedman 2000, 113). 
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5. Conclusion 
The concept of a basket of goods does not take away gradualism and therefore the need to draw 
a line somewhere in a continuum, a process that is ultimately arbitrary (see Nathwani 2000, 
367). But it would be just one line that we would have to draw, between voluntarily and 
involuntarily, between migration as a basic good and migration as a complementary good. The 
question that decision makers in individual cases would have to answer would only be that one: 
If I were in the shoes of this applicant, would the control over my own migration be a basic or 
a complementary good to me? This allows us to sidestep the impossible task of distinguishing 
political or environmental reasons for migrating from economic reasons, the impossible task to 
distinguish prosecution from other forms of political reasons for migration, the impossible task 
to identify the reason that ultimately triggered migration, etc. It reduces the number of fictitious 
bright lines to just one. What it can accomplish is all that we can hope to accomplish in the 
normative debate on involuntary migration. It can order the queue in a meaningful way: from 
those that rely most heavily on migration as a basic good to those for whom migration is still 
an important good but not one entirely without surrogates (see Lister 2013, 653). The question 
of how exactly to define refugeehood and where to draw the line between  two allegedly 
different groups loses in importance. Instead, the question of how the circle of those who are 
included in a status of special protection can be gradually enlarged moves to the fore.  
A refugee status thus designed could be combined with a status of subsidiary protection that is 
just marginally less entrenched than the refugee status. Whoever is found to value the good 
“control over their own migration” just marginally less than the beneficiaries of refugee status 
would benefit of this subsidiary status. And it may be combined with migration policies that 
recognize the freedom- and agency-enhancing effect of control over ones’ own migration for 
all potential migrants, no matter what their reasons for migrating and no matter what the degree 
of voluntariness of their movements. Such politics would seek for ways to gradually transfer 
this control to the individuals concerned. In sum, it would be a migration politics that is 
successful in identifying those most in need of international protection and granting them a 
right to protection without falling into the trap of searching for qualitative differences that are 
not there.   
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